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DDAS Accident Report
Accident details
Report date: 15/03/2004

Accident number: 373

Accident time: 13:20

Accident Date: 30/09/2001

Where it occurred: MNB West, Kurvala
region, Albania/Kosovo
border
Primary cause: Field control
inadequacy (?)

Country: Kosovo

Secondary cause: Inadequate training (?)

Class: Missed-mine accident
ID original source: BOI: No 016/2001

Date of main report: 09/10/2001
Name of source: KMACC

Organisation: Name removed
Mine/device: PMA-3 AP blast

Ground condition: grass/grazing area
rocks/stones

Date record created: 22/02/2004

Date last modified: 22/02/2004

No of victims: 1

No of documents: 2

Map details
Longitude:

Latitude:

Alt. coord. system: DN 2944 0742

Coordinates fixed by:

Map east: GR 34T

Map north:

Map scale:

Map series:

Map edition:

Map sheet:

Map name:

Accident Notes
inadequate training (?)
inadequate metal-detector (?)
pressure to work quickly (?)
mine/device found in "cleared" area (?)
inadequate area marking (?)
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Accident report
What follows is the report of a Board of Inquiry investigation that was made available in
January 2002. It has been edited for anonymity.

REPORT FOR ACCIDENT INVESTIGATION BOARD OF INQUIRY – No 016/2001
Mine Accident that occurred in MNB West on Sunday 30 September 2001.

Introduction
1) In accordance with the Mine Action Co-ordination Centre (MACC) Standard Working
Procedure No 4, the MACC Programme Manager issued a Convening Order on Sunday 30
September 2001 for an Accident Investigation Board of Inquiry. Annex A details the
Convening Order.
2) This is a comprehensive report by the Board of Inquiry into the mine accident that
occurred on Sunday 30 September 2001. Based on the investigation, interviews, statements
from [the Demining group] personnel involved in the accident, visits and photos of the
accident site, this accident is considered preventable.
3) This finding is based on the fact that at the time of the accident the Team Leader [the
Victim] was about to remove a PMA3 blast mine located by deminer [name excised]. This
mine was approximately 10cm past the base stick. As [the Victim] was getting into the prone
position to remove this mine he knelt on another PMA3 mine that was in the cleared lane.
4) The accident occurred at minefield number 431, Task Dossier number W01-43, GR 34T
DN 2944 0742 on 30 September 2001 at 1320 hours.

Events leading up to the Accident
5) The [Demining group] team’s call sign 13M and 56B1 have been conducting manual
clearance in the Kurvala region along the Albanian border for the past three weeks and have
been living on site in a field camp. The location is very remote and mountainous, and
requires a 40-minute walk up to the site from the nearest road. There are four minefields
within the Task Dossier W01-43. The minefield number 431 contains PMR2A fragmentation
mines with PMA3 blast mines as keepers. Within the vicinity of the accident site
approximately 50 PMA3 blast mines and five PMR2A fragmentation mines have been
removed and destroyed.
6) This is the third mine accident in six days at this minefield involving the team 13M. Due to
the previous accident at this site the team had re-commenced clearance on Saturday 29
September 2001. At approximately 1320hrs on the day of the accident, the team leader of
13M [the Victim] was called forward by one of his deminers [name excised] to remove a
PMA3 blast mine that he had located approximately 10cm beyond his base stick. [The Victim[
instructed the deminer to return to the rest area and wait until he had completed removing the
mine. As [the Victim] got into the prone position to remove the mine he knelt on another
PMA3 mine that was in the cleared lane. The resulting explosion was so severe as to almost
completely amputate his left leg above the knee.
7) The Victim fell face forward onto the ground and Deminer [two names removed] raced
forward, rolled him over and then proceeded to assist him. By this time the team medic
arrived and commenced first aid. A call was made to [another Demining group] to report the
mine accident and to request a helicopter CASEVAC. The MACC Programme Manager (PM)
and MACC Chief of Operations (COO) happened to be approaching the CP at the time of the
accident to visit the team, and they were able to assist with the CASEVAC. The CASEVAC
by helicopter of [the Victim] occurred with no problems.
8) Work on Sunday 30 October 2001 commenced for this team at 0745hrs. The team was
using the two man drill, with deminers (Deminer T) and (Deminer A) conducting clearance in
the lane of the accident. Deminer T was the first to commence clearance for the day in the
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lane, with deminer A in the rest area. Deminer T worked until the tea break, which was at
approximately 1000hrs. He has stated that he tested the metal detector prior to commencing
work in the lane. During his time of clearance he did not locate any mines. After the tea
break it was the turn of deminer A to conduct clearance in the lane. He has stated that he
tested the detector after the tea break prior to commencing work. Within 15 minutes of
starting clearance he located his first mine (PMA3). In accordance with the [Demining group’s]
procedure he called his team leader [who then] instructed Deminer A to wait in the rest area
whilst he removed the mine. This mine was removed without accident and Deminer A then
continued with his clearance. He then found a second and third PMA3 and these mines were
dealt with in the same manner. When Deminer A had located his fourth PMA3 he again
called [the Victim] forward. As with the previous three mines Deminer A returned to the rest
area and it was then that [the Victim] knelt on the undetected mine whilst in the process of
removing the fourth mine located by Deminer A.
9) The MACC QA Officer along with [the Demining group’s] Programme Manager (ITF
Contract) [name excised] commenced the investigation the following day. The accident site
had been left untouched since the time of the accident. The blast hole was approximately
1.5m before the base stick in the cleared lane. The metal detector was severely damaged in
the blast. The search head had been detached from the shaft and control box as a result of
the explosion. Deminer A had left the detector next to the left side mine tape of the clearance
lane when he returned to the rest area. The detector was beside [the Victim’s] left knee as he
knelt and was therefore caught in the blast.
10) The shape of the blast hole is not consistent with a single PMA3 explosion. Deminer A
has stated that he did not conduct any excavation in the vicinity of the mine that [the Victim]
knelt on. There is a possibility that there may have been two mines involved in the blast due
to the shape and size of the hole. The depth of the blast hole was not indicative of a deeply
laid mine.
11) The operational clearance plan for the two teams 13M and 56B1 in the mountain regions
is to work everyday that there is fine and suitable weather. Therefore both teams were
conducting clearance on this Sunday. However as with any mine/UXO clearance conducted
there was the necessary communications, medical and CASEVAC support in place.
Views of the accident site and blast crater are reproduced below. The site is within 25 metres
of the accident that occurred on 25th September 2001.
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[The lane marking does not include the use of regular stakes/posts and so its precise location
can be moved by wind.]
The Victim was in the process of getting into the prone position in order to remove the PMA3
located by Deminer A when he knelt on the another PMA3 in the cleared lane. This mine was
not located and was therefore missed by Deminer A. The Vallon Metal Detector was next to
the mine marking tape to the left of the lane. From the explosion the shaft was shattered and
the detector was in two pieces with the control box part way down the hill and the search
head in the lane.
Deminer A during his shift had located 4 x PMA3 mines. Two of the mines positions were
marked with mine sticks, the third was knocked over during the CASEVAC. The three mines
numbered 1 - 3 were all dealt with in the same manner with [the Victim] removing them and
placing them in the mine collection area. The fourth mine was about to be dealt with in the
same way when he knelt on the fifth mine that was undetected by Deminer A.

Work History of the Casualty
12) [The Victim] has been with The Demining group since 1996.

Past History of the Area
13) The accident site is Task Dossier W01-43, at minefield number 431. The minefields in
this task dossier are all in the Kurvala Mountain Range and were laid by the VJ Army along
the Kosovo – Albanian Border. There are a number of minefields along the border with
Albania and the majority have a high density of mines. The minefields contain both antipersonnel fragmentation and blast mines.

Sequence, Documentation and Procedure of Tasking
14) The Task Dossier No W01-43 was issued to [the Demining group] on 3 September 2001.
There are four minefields detailed in this dossier, 418, 431, 434 and 436. Minefields 434 and
418 have been completed and work continues on 431, with 436 yet to be started.

Geography and Weather
15) The Kurvala region is situated in the West of Kosovo along the Albanian border and
approximately 5Km South East of the Montenegrin border. It is a remote mountainous area
with heights exceeding 2600m in places. The height of this minefield is at 2300m. Access to
these minefields is either by foot or helicopter with no vehicle access. The nearest road is a
40 minute walk. The local populous from both Kosovo and Albania use these high plateaus
for summer grazing of their livestock. The weather at the time of the accident was slightly
overcast with variable winds and a temperature of approximately 15 degrees Celsius.
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Site Layout and Marking
16) The site layout and marking at the site was in accordance with [the Demining group’s]
SOPs for mine clearance. According to the Vojska Jugoslavije (VJ) minefield record, there are
three mine rows containing PMR2A fragmentation mines with PMA3 blast mines as keepers.

Management Supervision and Discipline
17) [The Demining group] is a commercial mine clearance company that employs
Zimbabwean Deminers, Team Leaders and Operations Officers. As such there is no local
demining capability within the company in Kosovo. The Operations Officer has operational
responsibility for the [Demining group’s] demining teams, with the team leaders directly
responsible for the day to day supervision on site of their respective teams. Each [Demining
group] demining team consists of a Team Leader, four manual deminers and a team medic.

Quality Assurance and Quality Control
18) [The Demining group] Internal Quality Control (QC) is achieved through a system of onsite checks by the Team Leader to ensure adherence to the mine clearance SOPs. The
normal procedure for QC is for the team leader to conduct a 10% check of the clearance
lanes using the same detector that the deminer used for the clearance. The MACC QA teams
conduct external Quality Assurance on a regular basis, normally each site is visited a
minimum of once per week. An external QA inspection had been conducted six days prior to
the accident by a MACC QA team. Prior to this a number of visits by the MACC COO, Ops
Offr and QA Offr had been conducted to this site on a regular basis.

Communications and Reporting
19) At the time of the accident there was effective communication by VHF hand-held
Motorola radios between the team site and callsign 56 [the Demining group Gjakova] on the
Kosovo wide net as well as the team site and [another Demining group] on the MNB(S) net.
This team site also has effective HF communications to all other [Demining group] callsigns
operating in Kosovo.
20) The MACC PM and COO had just arrived at the team CP when [the Victim] knelt on the
mine, and were therefore immediately aware of the accident.

Medical details
21) The initial injury that [the Victim] suffered was a very severe blast injury to his left knee.
He sustained no other injuries. Upon arrival at the German KFOR hospital in Prizren his left
leg was surgically amputated above the knee.

Personnel
22) Written statements from the [Demining group] personnel involved in the accident are at
Annex E. [Not made available.]

Dress and Personal Protective Equipment (PPE)
23) At the time of the accident [the Victim] was wearing his personal protective equipment in
accordance to [the Demining group’s] SOPs. [The demining group confirmed separately that
this was a frontal apron and a long visor.]

Tools and Equipment
24) The Victim was not using any tools or equipment at the time of the accident.
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Details of Mine Involved
25) [A datasheet on the PME-3 mine and how to disarm it was pasted here.]

Account of Activities
26) The following is a description of the events from the time of the accident until the casualty
was at the hospital:
Sunday 30 September 2001
0745hrs – Team 13M commence clearance operations in minefield 431 with Deminer T
having the first shift in the accident lane with Deminer A in the rest area.
1015hrs – Tea break for the team.
1045hrs – Deminer A tests the metal detector prior to commencing work in the lane.
1100hrs – Deminer A locates the first PMA3 and the next four up until the time of the
accident.
1320hrs – Uncontrolled detonation at minefield number 436 involving Team Leader [the
Victim] whilst he was in the process of removing the fourth PMA3 located by Deminer A.
1321hrs – [name excised] notified of the accident and CASEVAC helicopter requested. [The
Victim] given first aid by team medic and then stretchered to the helicopter winch area.
1409hrs – CASEVAC helicopter arrives at winch area. [The Victim] given further treatment by
German Doctor before loading into helicopter.
1425hrs –Helicopter departs for German KFOR hospital in Prizren..
Monday 1 October 2001
1300hrs – MACC QA Officer and [name excised] [the Demining group] Programme Manager
(ITF Contract) conduct scene examination of accident site.

Insurance details
27) All The Demining group staff involved in mine clearance activities in Kosovo are covered
by the standard [Demining group’s] insurance through Lloyds of London.

Conclusions
28) Based on the investigation, interviews, the statements and visits to the site, the Board of
Inquiry concludes the following:
•

There was an uncontrolled detonation of a PMA3 anti-personnel mine on Sunday 30
September 2001 in [the Demining group’s] minefield number 431 situated in the
Kurvala region of Kosovo. [The Victim] was in the process of removing a PMA3 mine
when he knelt on another PMA3 that was missed by Deminer [name excised]
(Deminer A).

•

As a result of the uncontrolled detonation [the Victim] suffered very serious injury to
his left leg and consequently the German KFOR doctors amputated the leg above the
knee.

•

Deminer A had located four PMA3 blast mines during his shift up until the time of the
accident. However he did not locate the PMA3 that [the Victim] knelt on and caused
the accident. The blast hole indicates that this mine was not laid at an excessive
depth. The mine that was missed was clearly within Deminer A’s area of
responsibility for clearance and ought to have been located.
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•

Deminer T is not at fault for the cause of the accident as his area of responsibility for
clearance was not part of the area where the mine was missed.

Recommendations
29) The following are recommendations based on the Board of Inquiry conclusions:
•

[The Demining group] management takes the appropriate disciplinary action against
Deminer A for this very serious breach of clearance standards that has caused this
most unfortunate accident.

•

[The Demining group] management and supervisory staff are to re-emphasis to their
deminers the need to maintain concentration and due care whilst conducting manual
clearance drills. The [Demining group] team leaders are to be extra vigilant to ensure
their deminers are conducting their clearance drills effectively and safely.

Signed: UNMIK Mine Action Co-ordination Centre
Quality Assurance Officer

Annexes: [Not made available]
A.
MACC convening order for accident investigation Board of Inquiry.
B.
Map of the general area.
C.
Schematic diagram of the general accident area.
D.
IMSMA Mine Accident Report.
E.
Witness Statements.
F.
Medical report from the MACC QA Officer.
G.
The Demining group Internal Investigation Report

Comments by the MACC Chief Operations Officer
Reference:
Accident Report, 25 Sep 01
Accident Report, 27 Sep 01
Accident Report, 30 Sep 01
1) Three separate mine clearance accidents occurred over a 5 day period in the same
minefield and involving the same mine clearance team. Whilst the technical cause of each
accident is different and is addressed in three separate Mine Accident Investigation Reports,
they are all inter-linked with the underlying origins of increased hazard, due to density and
location of minefield, and subsequent requirement for more vigilant supervision and pro-active
management support.
2) Therefore, for ease of reference and objective conclusions, they will all be grouped
together and commented on below.
3) The first accident, as detailed at Reference A, may be clearly attributed to a lack of
attention on the part of Deminer [name excised]. He had either failed to detect a PMA-3 and
unknowingly moved his base stick close to or on top of it, or he was so distracted by the
proximity of the PMR-2 that he inadvertently moved his base stick further forward than
normal. This in a confined area that a significant number of mines had already been located
in.
4) The initial Medevac request was for the wrong location and the resulting confusion and
time delays may have proved critical if the casualty had sustained a more serious injury.
5) This accident should have indicated a definite requirement for closer management
supervision of this technically difficult and remote site.
6) The second accident, as detailed at Reference B, following on as it did from the first,
should not have been allowed to cause such an injury. If the injured deminer, [name excised],
had been paying the necessary attention to detail, wearing his visor correctly and adopting
the prone position whilst prodding onto a probable PMA-3 mine, it is likely that, should the
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accident still have occurred, he would have sustained only slight injuries as he would have
been offered the full protection of his facial PPE.
7) The fact that he was not should have, again, highlighted an urgent requirement to review
the supervisory and management oversight of this remote and technically difficult site.
Additionally, once again, incorrect and critical information was passed during the Medevac
request.
8) The third accident, detailed at Reference C, is clearly attributable to negligence on the part
of deminer [name excised]. At the time of writing, at least another two PMA-3 mines have
been located in adjacent cleared areas and this conclusively underlines the lack of close
supervision and management support required to operate at this location.
9) [The demining group] have built a reputation, in Kosovo, based on professional
competency, operational effectiveness and the sheer hard work of their deminers. This
reputation is fully justified and endorsed by the MACC; it was for precisely this reason that
[the demining group] were selected to work on this demanding site. These accidents, coming
as they do at the end of a long two years of sustained operations and nearly 4000 mines
safely found and destroyed, should not detract from the credit due to the [Demining group]
deminers or [the demining group] as an organisation. Rather they should serve as an
unfortunate reminder of the constant need to remain vigilant and to sustain supervisory and
management oversight during this final, intense, stage of the mine clearance programme in
Kosovo.
10) The Conclusions of the Board of Inquiry are fully concurred with. The Recommendations
are also endorsed and are to be implemented immediately. Whilst future accidents may be a
probability, one attributed to the same, or similar, causes is unacceptable.

Victim Report
Victim number: 478

Name: Name removed
Gender: Male

Age:
Status: supervisory

Fit for work: not known

Compensation: Not made available

Time to hospital: More than 1 hour 15
minutes

Protection issued: Frontal apron

Protection used: Frontal apron, Long
visor

Long visor

Summary of injuries:
AMPUTATION/LOSS
Leg Above knee
COMMENT
No medical report was made available.

Analysis
The primary cause of this accident is listed as a “Field Control Inadequacy” because the
investigators concluded that the deminer carelessly missed the mine that his supervisor knelt
on. It is possible that his training was inadequate, and also that his detector may have been
unable to detect the mine reliably in those conditions. However, if the investigators were right,
the deminer was not being supervised adequately.
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This accident was one of several involving the same demining group in the same mined area
over a very short time. Under “Related papers” is a document produced by the MACC
following this rash of accidents in which they emphasised the need for better supervision by
the demining group Management.
The accidents raise questions over the competency of the field supervisors, and so cast some
doubt over their training and selection – both of which are the responsibility of more senior
management. The Secondary cause is listed as “Inadequate training”, which may apply to the
deminer who missed the mine, his supervisor, or senior management.
Although the investigator did not identify it as a cause, the photographs he took during the
investigation show that lane marking was potentially imprecise and used a method that would
not have been acceptable to many demining groups, and is not as recommended in the
IMAS.

Related papers
As a result of a rash of accidents involving this demining group, the MACC issued combined
conclusions of those accidents stressing the need for improved site management. This paper
is reproduced below, edited for anonymity.

Comments by the MACC Chief Operations Officer
Reference:
Accident Report, 25 Sep 01
Accident Report, 27 Sep 01
Accident Report, 30 Sep 01
1) Three separate mine clearance accidents occurred over a 5 day period in the same
minefield and involving the same mine clearance team. Whilst the technical cause of each
accident is different and is addressed in three separate Mine Accident Investigation Reports,
they are all inter-linked with the underlying origins of increased hazard, due to density and
location of minefield, and subsequent requirement for more vigilant supervision and pro-active
management support.
2) Therefore, for ease of reference and objective conclusions, they will all be grouped
together and commented on below.
3) The first accident, as detailed at Reference A, may be clearly attributed to a lack of
attention on the part of Deminer [name excised]. He had either failed to detect a PMA-3 and
unknowingly moved his base stick close to or on top of it, or he was so distracted by the
proximity of the PMR-2 that he inadvertently moved his base stick further forward than
normal. This in a confined area that a significant number of mines had already been located
in.
4) The initial Medevac request was for the wrong location and the resulting confusion and
time delays may have proved critical if the casualty had sustained a more serious injury.
5) This accident should have indicated a definite requirement for closer management
supervision of this technically difficult and remote site.
6) The second accident, as detailed at Reference B, following on as it did from the first,
should not have been allowed to cause such an injury. If the injured deminer, [name excised],
had been paying the necessary attention to detail, wearing his visor correctly and adopting
the prone position whilst prodding onto a probable PMA-3 mine, it is likely that, should the
accident still have occurred, he would have sustained only slight injuries as he would have
been offered the full protection of his facial PPE.
7) The fact that he was not should have, again, highlighted an urgent requirement to review
the supervisory and management oversight of this remote and technically difficult site.
Additionally, once again, incorrect and critical information was passed during the Medevac
request.
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8) The third accident, detailed at Reference C, is clearly attributable to negligence on the part
of deminer [name excised]. At the time of writing, at least another two PMA-3 mines have
been located in adjacent cleared areas and this conclusively underlines the lack of close
supervision and management support required to operate at this location.
9) [The demining group] have built a reputation, in Kosovo, based on professional
competency, operational effectiveness and the sheer hard work of their deminers. This
reputation is fully justified and endorsed by the MACC; it was for precisely this reason that
[the demining group] were selected to work on this demanding site. These accidents, coming
as they do at the end of a long two years of sustained operations and nearly 4000 mines
safely found and destroyed, should not detract from the credit due to the [Demining group]
deminers or [the demining group] as an organisation. Rather they should serve as an
unfortunate reminder of the constant need to remain vigilant and to sustain supervisory and
management oversight during this final, intense, stage of the mine clearance programme in
Kosovo.
10) The Conclusions of the Board of Inquiry are fully concurred with. The Recommendations
are also endorsed and are to be implemented immediately. Whilst future accidents may be a
probability, one attributed to the same, or similar, causes is unacceptable.
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